Symmetrization for finite two-person games by Jurg, A.P. et al.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research (1992) 36:111- 123 
A Symmetrization for Finite Two-Person Games 
By A.P.  Jurg ~, M. J .M.  Jansen ~'2, J .A.M.  Potters ~ and S.H. Tijs ~ 
Abstract: The symmetrization method of Gale, Kuhn and Tucker for matrix games is extended for 
bimatrix games. It is shown that the equilibria of a bimatrix game and its symmetrization correspond 
two by two. A similar result is found with respect to quasi-strong, regular and perfect equilibria. 
Key Words: Bimatrix Game, Equilibria, Symmetrization 
1 Introduction 
This paper is devoted to a symmetrization method for finite two-person games 
(bimatrix games), which originates from a method for matrix games by Gale et 
al. (1950). 
Already in the fundamental paper of von Neumann (1928) attention is paid 
to symmetric matrix (two-person, zero-sum) games and it is observed that these 
games have value zero. An alternative proof of this result is given by Brown and 
von Neumann (1950), where it is extended to a proof of existence of a value for 
general matrix games by referring to a symmetrization method of Gale, Kuhn 
and Tucker (1950). Also an alternative to this method is provided. 
In a symmetric game both players have the same strategic possibilities and 
there is no discrimination i the payoffs. Therefore a symmetrization f a game 
is an extension of this game to fair play. In fact, where in real-life situations peo- 
ple play games, they tend to symmetrize by means of tossing, exchanging roles 
in a second play, etc. This motivates the study of symmetrizations for finite two- 
person games that are not zero-sum. Furthermore symmetric games play an im- 
portant role in the new field of sociobiology, founded by Maynard Smith (1982), 
where evolutionary stable strategies correspond to special symmetric equilibria. 
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Griesmer, Hoffman and Robinson (1963) propose a symmetrization method 
for bimatrix games. For such games this method and the method of yon 
Neumann (Brown and von Neumann, 1950) are extensively studied in a paper of 
Jansen, Potters and Tijs (1986). Correspondences between equilibria and some 
refinements of equilibria for a game and for its symmetrization are given with 
respect o either type. In this paper we deal with a similar correspondence, but 
now concerning the symmetrization method of Gale, Kuhn and Tucker. 
Therefore, in Section 3, we extend this method to the case of bimatrix games. 
In Section 4, we give a correspondence with respect o equilibria and in Section 
5 we test three types of refinements, i.e. quasi-strong, regular and perfect 
equilibria, for a similar property. Section 2 is preliminary. 
The method described in this paper yields a one-to-one correspondence b - 
tween pairs of equilibria for a game and pairs of equilibria for its symmetriza- 
tion. A similar statement holds for each of the three refinements discussed here. 
Jansen, Potters and Tijs showed that such a nice correspondence does not exist 
for the method of Griesmer, Hoffman and Robinson. On the contrary the meth- 
od of von Neumann implies a similar one-to-one correspondence. However, in 
this case, the 'size' of the symmetrization f a game with m and n pure strategies 
for the players, respectively, is large: In this symmetrization both players have 
m.n pure strategies. For the symmetrization f Gale, Kuhn and Tucker this num- 
ber is m + n + 1 (and m + n for the symmetrization o f Griesmer, Hoffman and 
Robinson). This makes the latter symmetrization more interesting for computa- 
tional purposes. 
Notat ion :  We denote by e 1 . . . . .  e n the standard basis vectors of R n. 1 n ~ R n cor- 
n 
responds to (1,1 . . . . .  1). For x ,y  e R n we define (x ,y )  : = ~ x iy  i and we write 
i=1 
x>_y (x>y)  if x i>y  i (x i>Yi)  for all is[1 . . . . .  n}. A matrix A is called strictly 
positive (strictly negative), and we write A > 0 (A < 0) if all the entries of A are 
positive (negative). By A t we denote the transpose of a matrix A. 
2 Preliminaries 
Let A = [aij]m= lj=n 1 and B = [b/j]m= lj=ln be two real m• matrices. We con- 
sider the finite two-person game (Am,An,  K ,L ) ,  where for t ~N 
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and where the payoff-functions K,L:Am• are defined by K(p,q)= 
m n m n 
pAq:= ~ ~ Piaijqj and L(p,q) =pBq:= ~ ~ pibijqj. We call this game 
i= l j= l  i= l j= l  
the m • n bimatrix game (A,B). 
For the game (A,B) we define an equilibrium as a strategy pair (p,c)) ~ 
A m XA n with pA EI>_pA 0 and pB(l>_pBq for all (p,q) cA m xA n. Nash (1951) 
showed that the set E(A,B) of all equilibria for (A,B) is non-empty. 
For a strategy p~A m we define its carrier by C(p) := {i~{1 . . . . .  m}lPi>O } 
and the set of pure best replies of the second player against p by PB(B,p):= 
{j~[1 . . . . .  n}lpBe i = max pBet}. For a strategy q~An, its carrier C(q) and 
1~{1 . . . . .  n} 
the set PB(A,q) of pure best replies of the first player against q are defined 
similarly. 
It is well-known that a strategy pair (p, q) is an equilibrium for (A, B) if and 
only if C(p) C PB(A, q) and C(q) C PB(B,p). 
For the game (A, B) a subset T of the equilibrium set E(A, B) is called a Nash 
subset if (p,q),(r,s)r implies (p,s),(r,q)r T. Jansen (1981) showed that 
E(A,B) is the finite union of maximal Nash subsets, where a Nash subset is 
called maximal if it is not properly contained in another Nash subset. 
An n• bimatrix game (A,B) is called symmetric if B=A t. It is easily 
verified that for a symmetric game (A,At),(p,q)~E(A,A t) if and only if 
(q,p) r 
Finally in this section we note that for a bimatrix game (A, B), the equilibri- 
um set E(A,B) is invariant under the operation where to every entry of one of 
the matrices the same real number is added. So without loss of generality we may 
always assume A > 0 and B < 0. 
3 Gale, Kuhn and Tucker Symmetrization Method for Bimatrix Games 
In this section we extend the method of Gale, Kuhn and Tucker for symmetrizing 
a matrix game to the case of a bimatrix game. We consider an m x n bimatrix 
game (A, B) such that A > 0 and B < 0. We will call the symmetric bimatrix game 
(C, ct), where C is the (m + n + 1) x (m + n + 1) matrix 
C= 
I O A - lm]  
B t 0 1 n , 
1 m - 1 n 0 
the Gale, Kuhn and Tucker symmetrization f (A, B), in short GKT-symmetriza- 
tion. 
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In order to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence b tween pairs of 
equilibria for the game (A ,B)  and pairs of equilibria for the game (C, Ct), we 
first describe how an equilibrium for (C ,C t) yields two equilibria for (A ,B) .  
Therefore we need a lemma and some notation. 
For a strategy "C~Am+n+ 1 we let Zx:= (rl . . . . .  2"m) , 2"y:= (2"m_~l . . . . .  "Cm+n) 
and rz: = "t'rn+n+ 1. Then r = ('Cx,'Cy,'rz). 
Lemma 1: Let (C, C t) be the GKT-symmetrization f an m • n bimatrix game 
(A, B) with A > 0 and B < 0. Let (~, a) ~ E(C,  c t ) .  Then Qx :~ 0, 0y g: 0, 0z :~ 0, 
ax --/: O, ay --/: O and az --# O. 
Proof." We prove the lemma by following the scheme below. 
(a) (b) 
~x#=O ~ ay#:O ~ ~z-'#O 
(f) ~ ~ (c) 
(e) (d) 
az ~ O = Qy--/:O ~ ax--/:O 
Note that, since O, aeAm+n+ 1, we already have Q_>O, a_>O and ~):/: O, a :~ O. 
We start at the upper left corner of the scheme: 
(a) Assume Ox v~ O. Then there is an io ~ [1 . . . . .  m} such that 
f max e iAcry -a  z i~{1 . . . . .  m] 
eioCa = eioA ay -az  > max axBej+ a z 
je{1 . . . . .  n} 
(0" z, lm)-(f ly, ln) . 
Suppose r Then e ioCa=eioAay-az=-az<_O.  This yields 0_  
(ax, lm) - (ay ,  ln) = (ax, lm). So ax= O. This again implies 0> max axBe j 
j~{1 . . . . .  n} 
+ a z = a z. So a z = 0. Consequently a = 0, which is a contradiction. Hence 
O'y r 0.  
(b) Assume cry :g: 0. Then there is a j0e{m+ 1, . . .  , re+n} such that 
(- max eiA Qy - Oz 
iE I1, . . . ,m} 
oCt  e 9 .~ max OxBej+~o z Jo = "~ m 4- Qz >- l ie{1 . . . . .  n} 
k(Ox, lm)-(~y, 1.) . 
Suppose Qz = Qx = 0. Then 0>__ max eiAQy. Since A >0 this implies 
i~{1 . . . . .  m] 
0y = 0. Consequently Q = 0, which is a contradiction. Now suppose Qz = 0, 
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(c) 
Ox*0. Then, since B<0,  we have O>QxBejo_m>_ max 
ie{1 . . . . .  m} 
max eiA Qy. This contradicts A > 0. Consequently Qz r 0. 
ie{l . . . .  ,m} 
Assume 9z r O. Then 
eiA ~Oy -- kOz = 
(- max e iAay-a  z 
l n )>.~ i~{1 . . . . .  m} 
em+n+lCa=(ax ' lm) - (aY '  [ max  axBej+a z . 
k.je{1 . . . . .  n} 
Suppose ax=0.  Then 0_>-(O'y, ln)_> max axBe j+az=a z. Hence 
je{1 . . . . .  n} 
az= 0. Consequently 0>_(-ay, ln)>_ max eiAay. Since A>0,  this im- 
ie{1,... ,m} 
plies ay = 0. Consequently a = 0, which is a contradiction. Hence axr  O. 
The implications (d), (e) and (f) can be proved in a similar way. Since 0 r 0 
(a r 0), at least one of the vectors Ox, Oy and Qz (ax, ay and az) has a positive 
coordinate. So we are in the situation of the scheme. 9 
In view of Lemma 1, for an equilibrium (Q, a) for (C, ct) ,  Qx and Qy can be 
normalized so that they become strategies in A m and A n respectively. These 
strategies are important in 
Theorem 1: Let (C, C t) be the GKT-symmetrization f an m x n bimatrix game 
(A,B)  with A>0 and B<0.  Let (Q,a)~E(C,  Ct). Then (Qx(Qx, lm) -1, 
ay(ay, ln) -1) eE(A ,B)  and (ax(a x, lm) -1, Qy(Qy, ]n) -1) ~E(A,B) .  
Proof." Since (O, a) e E(C, C t) we have 
~eiA cry - a z 
eiCa = .] a xBei -m+az 
t,(ax, lm)-- (%, ~n) 
for ie [1 , . . . ,m} 
for i~[m+ l , . . . ,m+n} 
for i=m+n+l  
(1) 
and 
-ejA Oy - Qz 
oCt  ej = ~ OxBej_rn +~O z 
~(Ox, l m) - (Oy, In) 
for je{1 . . . . .  m} 
for j~{m+ 1 . . . . .  m+n} 
for j=m+n+l  . 
(2) 
By Lemma 1, Ox r 0 and ay r O. 
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Suppose (Qx)i>0. Then, since C(Q)CPB(C ,a ) ,  we obtain eiAay-az= 
max {ekAay-az}. Hence eiAay= max ekAay. Similarly, if (ay)j>0, 
k~[1 . . . . .  m} ka[1 . . . . .  m} 
then oxBej = max OxBet. 
tE{l . . . . .  n} 
This implies C(Qx(Qx, lm) -1) C PB(A,ay(~y, ln)- l),  and C(ay(ay, in) -l) C 
PB(B, Ox(Q x, lm)-l). Hence (Qx(Ox, lm) -1, r In) -1) ~E(A,B).  
Similarly one shows (ax(ax, lm)- 1, Oy(~Oy, in)- 1) E(A, B). 9 
If (0, a) ~ E(C, ct), then also (a, O) ~ E(C, C t). According to Theorem 1 
these two equilibria of (C, C t) yield the same two equilibria for (A,B). We now 
concern ourselves with a converse statement. Therefore we need the following 
definition. 
For (p,q), ~,gl)~E(A,B),  the GKT-product (p,q),(l?,gl) is defined as 
2-pBq' 2+pAO' 2-pBq 2+~AO: ' 
x(2_~.B  , q 1 1 1 q ) )  
0 2+pAq'  2 -pBO 2+pA " 
Note that the GKT-product * is well-defined since A > 0 and B < 0. 
In fact we have (P,q)*(P,O)eArn+n+1XAm+n+l. Furthermore, if (0,a):  = 
(P,q)*(P,O), then (a,0) = (P,O)*(P,q). The next theorem shows the relevance 
of the GKT-product. 
Theorem 2: Let (C, C t) be the GKT-symmetrization f an m x n bimatrix game 
(A,B) with A>0 and B<0.  Let (p,q),(~,O)eE(A,B). Then (P,q)*(P,O)e 
E(C, C t) and (p, (1) * (P, q) ~ E(C, ct). 
Proof." Let, for (p,q),(#,O)eE(A,B), (O,a):=(p,q)*(P,O). Then (Q,a)e 
Am+n+ 1• 1 and 9x r 0, Qy r 0, 0z r 0, and a x r 0, ay -% 0, a z r 0 by con- 
struction. 
(a) For ie{1 . . . . .  m} such that •i>0 we originally had pi>O. From C(p)C 
pB(A,q)  it then follows that eiAq = max ekAq. Then we obtain from 
the GKT-product k~ll . . . . .  m} 
eiCa = ei A q(2 + pA q)- 1 _ (1 - (2 -pBt~)-  1 _ (2 + pA q)- 1) 
= max ekCa 9 
k~{1, . . . ,m]  
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Since max ekA q = pA q, the last expression also equals (2 - /3B0) -1_  
ke{1 . . . . .  m} 
(2 +pA q)- ~. 
(b) Similarly, for a je{m+ 1, . . .  ,m+n} with Oj>0 
ejCa = max elCa = (2 -pBO) - I - (2+pAq)  -1 
lE[m+ 1 . . . . .  re+n} 
(c) Since em + n + 1 C a = (2 - A0B 0) -  1 _ (2 + pA q)- 1, it follows from (a) and (b) 
that max ekCa = (2 -pBO) - I - (2+pAq)  -1 
k~{l . . . . .  m+n+ 11 
(d) Combining (a), (b) and (c) we obtain C(0) C PB(C, a). Similarly one shows 
C(a) C PB(Ct, o). Hence (0 ,a )EE(C ,  Ct), or equivalently (P,q)*(P,O)~ 
E ( C, ct ). Similarly one proves (/5,0)*(p,q) ~ E ( C, Ct ). 9 
The next theorem shows that each equilibrium for the GKT-symmetrization 
of a bimatrix game is the GKT-product of two equilibria for this bimatrix game. 
Theorem 3: Let (C, C t) be the GKT-symmetrization f an m • n bimatrix game 
(A,B) with A>0 and B<0.  Let (o,a)~E(C, Ct). Then there are equilibria 
(P,q),(P,O) ~E(A,B)  such that (O,a)= (P,q)*(P,O). 
Proof." From Lemma 1 we obtain Oz>0. So oCa=(ax,  lm)-(ay, ln) and 
Qcta = (~Ox, lm) -  (Qy, ln). Let P = (Qx, lm)-l~~ q = (ay, ln)-aay, p = 
07x, lm)-l~x and ~l=(Qy, ln)-lQy. From Lemma 1 we obtain P,PeAm and 
q,O~An. By Theorem 1, (p,q),(~,O)~E(A,B). Furthermore max OxBej+ 
Oz = (~x, l n ) -  (0y, ln) (cf. (2)). Consequently j~fl ..... nl 
max pBe~ = (Ox, lm) :-1 [(LOx, lm)--(Qy, ln ) -Qz]  9 
j~[1 . . . . .  n} 
S ince  0 e A m + n + 1, we  have  (Ox, l ra )+ (Qy, ]n )  + Qz = 1. Hence  
max pBej= (~Ox, lm)- l [2(Qx,  lm) - l ]  . 
j~{1 . . . . .  n} 
Since (p,q)~E(A,B),  pBq = max pBej. Hence pBq= (Qx, lm)  -1 
• [2(Ox, lm) -  1], or j~{1 ..... n} 
(Px, ~rh) = (2 -pBq) -  1 . (3) 
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Similarly one obtains 
(0"y, ln) = (2 + pA q)- 
(0"x, lm)= (2- /SBq)  -~ 




Now, if we use (3) - (6) in the definition of the GKT-product of the strategy pairs 
(p,q) and (/3,~), we find (p ,q ) . (~,~)  = (0,0"). 9 
Theorems 1- 3 yield a one-to-one correspondence b tween pairs of equilibria 
for a bimatrix game, and (symmetric) pairs of equilibria for the GKT-sym- 
metrization of this bimatrix game. In the last theorem of this section we show 
that there is a similar correspondence with respect o maximal Nash subsets for 
the two games. 
In order to describe this correspondence, wedefine the GKT-product also for 
maximal Nash subsets. Let (A,B) be an m • n bimatrix game and let (C, C t) be 
the GKT-symmetrization f (A,B). Let S and T be maximal Nash subsets for 
(A,B). Then the GKT-product of S and T is defined as 
S* T:={(p,q)*(r,s)l(p,q)eS and (r,s)e T} . 
Theorem 4: Let (C, C t) be the GKT-symmetrization f an m • n bimatrix game 
(A,B) with A>0 and B<0.  
(i) If S and Tare maximal Nash subsets for (A,B), then S* Tand T*S are max- 
imal Nash subsets for (C, ct). 
(ii) If U is a maximal Nash subset for (C, Ct), then U = S* T for some maximal 
Nash subsets S and T for (A,B). 
Proof." (i). Let S and Tbe maximal Nash subsets for (A,B). We only show that 
S* T is a maximal Nash subset for (C, Ct). 
(ia) First we show that S* T is a Nash subset. Take (01, a0,  (02, 0.2) eS*  T. 
By definition (01, al) = (Pl, q0 * (/31, ql) for some (Pl, ql) e S and (/31, ql) e T and 
(02, 02) = (P2, q2) * (/32, 02) for some (Pz, q2) ~ S and (/32, q2) e T. 
By Theorem 2, (01, a0,  (02, 0.2) ~ E(C, Ct). 
If we show that (Q1,0.2) e S* T and (02, 0.1) e S* T, it follows that S* T is a Nash 
subset. We only show (01,0.2) ~ S * T. 
By construction 
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( P___I 41 = , , l - (2 -p lBqO- l - (2+#lAO1) - l j  
01 \2_p lBq l  2+fo-~1A41 .] 
O.2 = /2 -/'~2Bq2/~"-'22, 2+p2Aq2q2 , l_(2_•2B42)- l_(2+p2Aq2)- l l .  
Since (Pa,q0 and (P2,q2) are elements of S, we find plBql =plBq2 = maxq~A 
plBq and pzAq2 =plAq2 .
Similarly/~lA 0i =/32A 41 and/~2B02 =/32941. 
Consequently we find (01,02) = (/91, q2) * (#2, 41) E S* T. Hence S* T is a Nash 
subset. 
(ib) Now suppose U is a maximal Nash subset for (C, C t) containing S * T. 
Let (rl, 0)0, (z2, 0)2) e U. From Theorem 3 we obtain for i = 1,2 that (zi, 0)i) = 
(ri, si).(Ti,~), where (ri, si),(fi,~) ~E(A,B). 
Evidently also (rl, 0)2) and (r2, 0)1) are elements of U. From the expression for 
the GKT-products (ri, si)*(f~.,~) for i=  1,2, we find 
rl 
T 1 = 
2 - r 1Bs 1 
0)  2 = . _ _  , 
2-  f2Bg 2 
, 1 - (2 - r lBSO- l - (2+f lAg l )  -1.'~ , gl 
/ 
, 1-(2-fzBgz)- l - (2+r2As2) -1.'~ . $2 
2 + r2 A s2 / 
Since (rl, 0)2) ~ E(C, ct), we obtain from Theorem 3 that there are (p, q), (/3, 4) 
E(A,B) such that (rl,0)2) = (P,q)*(#,?l). 
m m 
Hence we have e.g. P ~  - ra . Using ~ Pi = ~ (rl)i = 1, we find 
1 1 2 -pBq 2 - r iBs  1 i=1 i=1 
- -  - - - ,  and consequently p = rl. 
2-pBq 2 - r iBs  1 
Similarly q = s2, P = r2 and 0 = si. So (rl,s2)= (p,q)~E(A,B) and (fz, gl)= 
(#,4)eE(A,B).  By considering (r2,0)0 in a similar way, we obtain (rz, sl), 
(fa,gz)~E(A,B). This implies that [(rl,sl),(rz,Sz),(ra,sz),(rz,sO] and {(~1,gl), 
(f2,gz),(fl,gz),(fz,g0} are Nash subsets for (A,B). 
Since the (~'i, 0)i) are chosen arbitrary in U, we obtain that U is the GKT-product 
of two Nash subsets for (A,B). So in view of (ia) we obtain U= S* Tand hence 
S* T is a maximal Nash subset. 
(ii) Let U be a maximal Nash subset for (C, ct). Similar to the proof above, 
we obtain that U is the GKT-product of two Nash subsets for (A,B). Each of 
these Nash subsets is contained in a maximal Nash subset for (A,B), and from 
(i) we obtain that the GKT-product of these maximal Nash subsets is a maximal 
Nash subset 0 for (C, ct). Evidently U C U. However, this implies U = 0 and 
U is the GKT-product of two maximal Nash subsets for (C, ct). 9 
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4 Behaviour of Refinements 
In this section we investigate how three refinements of equilibria behave in the 
procedure of the GKT-symmetrization. 
First we deal with quasi-strong equilibria, which were introduced by Harsanyi 
(1973). 
An equilibrium (p,q) for a bimatrix game (A,B) is called quasi-strong if
C(p) = PB(A, q) and C(q)= PB(B,p). The reader should note that not every 
equilibrium for a bimatrix game is quasi-strong. It is unknown whether every 
bimatrix game possesses a quasi-strong equilibrium. 
Theorem 5: Let (C, C t) be the GKT-symmetrization f an m x n bimatrix game 
(A,B) with A>0 and B<0.  
(i) If (p ,q) ,~,O)eE(A,B)  are quasi-strong, then both (P,q)*(P,O)e 
E(C, C t) and (p, ~)* (p, q)eE(C,  C t) are quasi-strong. 
(ii) If (4, a) e E(C, C t) is quasi-strong, then both (Qx(Ox, lm)-1, ay(ay, in)-1) 
E(A,B) and (ax(ax, lm) -1, Qy(Oy, I , )  -1) eE(A,B)  are quasi-strong. 
Proof." (i) Let (P,q) ,~,gl)eE(A,B) both the quasi-strong and define (Q,a): = 
(P,q)*(p, cl). Since, by Theorem 2, (~,a)eE(C,  Ct), we obtain for iE 
{1, . . . .  m+n+ 1} that ~i>0 implies eiCa = max ekCa. 
Suppose that for ie{1 . . . . .  m+n+l}  k~{1 ..... re+n+1} 
eiCa = max ekCa . (7) 
ke{1 . . . .  , rn+n+l}  
Since Px -  P----P----, we find that (~x)i0>0 for at least one i0e{l, . . .  ,m}. 
2-pBq 
Hence max ekCa = max ekCa. 
kE[1 . . . . .  m+n+l}  kc{1 . . . .  ,m} 
For k e {1 . . . . .  m} we have ekCa = ekA q(2 +pA q)- 1 _ az" Consequently, if 
(7) is satisfied for an i e {1 . . . . .  m}, then 
eiAq(2+pAq) -1 -a  z = eiCa = max ekCa 
k~{1 . . . . .  m+n+l ]  
= max ekCa= max ekAq(2+pAq) -~-a  z. 
k~[1, . . . ,m} ke{l . . . . .  ml 
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So eiA q = max ekAq. Since C(p)= PB(A,q),  we obtain that pi>O, and 
k~[1 .. . . .  m} 
consequently oi>O. Similarly one proves that if (7) is satisfied for an i~ 
Im+ 1 . . . . .  m+n}, then also Qi>0. 
Finally, by Lemma 1, ~o m + n + 1 > 0. Hence we have that for i ~ {1 . . . . .  m + n + 1}, 
(7) implies ~i>0. This implies C(Q)= PB(C,a).  Similarly one shows C(a)= 
PB(Ct, Q). Therefore (0, o-) is a quasi-strong equilibrium for (C, ct). 
Similar arguments show that (a,Q)=(P,O)*(P,q) is a quasi-strong 
equilibrium for (C, Ct). 
(ii) The proof follows immediately from (1) and (2). 9 
For a bimatrix game an isolated equilibrium is an equilibrium which is a max- 
imal Nash subset itself. In view of Theorem 4 we obtain that Theorem 5 also 
holds if we replace the word quasi-strong by isolated. In Jansen (1987) a regulari- 
ty concept for equilibria is introduced and it is proved that an equilibrium is 
regular if and only if it is isolated and quasi-strong. Hence we have 
Corollary: Theorem 5 also holds if quasi-strong is replaced by regular. 
Next we prove a result on perfect equilibria. This refinement was introduced 
by Selten (1975), who also showed that every bimatrix game possesses a perfect 
equilibrium. Instead of giving the original definition of perfectness we use the 
following equivalence proved by van Damme (1987): For a bimatrix game an 
equilibrium is perfect if and only if both equilibrium strategies are undominated, 
where for an m x n bimatrix game (A,B) a strategy p ~ A m (q ~ A,,) is called un- 
dominated if for every/3 ~ A m (Cl E An) such that ~A >_pA (Bgl>_Bq) we have 
~A = pA (Bgl = Bq). 
Theorem 6: Let (C, C t) be the GKT-symmetrization f an m x n bimatrix game 
(A,B) with A>O and B<O. 
(i) If (p,q),( /3,g/)~E(A,B) are perfect, then both (P,q)*(p, cl)eE(C, C t) and 
(P, el) * (P, q) ~ E(C, C t) are perfect. 
(ii) If (O,~)~E(C,C t) is perfect, then both (Ox(Ox, lm) -1, ay(ay, ln)- l )e 
E(A,B) and (ax(ax, lm) -1, Oy(Oy, ln) -1) ~E(A,B)  are perfect. 
Proof." (i) Let (p,q),(P,O)eE(A,B) both be perfect and define (0 ,a ) := 
(p, q) 9 (/3, 0). Since, by Theorem 2, (0, a) ~ E(C, C t) we only have to show that 
Q and a are undominated strategies for the game (C, ct). Suppose a 0 e Am+n+ 1
exists such that O C>_QC, or equivalently, using the GKT-product, 
I B~y + Qz lm "] 
OxA-~l. [ 
(~y, ln) -- (~x, lm)A  
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(-B ~ (2 +/~A 4)- 1 + (1 - (2 +/3A 4)- 1 _ (2 -pBq) -  1) lm" )
>_ |pA(2 -pBq) - l - ( l - (2+hAO) - l - (2 -pBq) - l ) l , , [  
[ (2 +pA (1)-1 _ (2 -pBq) -1  j 
(8) 
We consider two cases: 
(a) ~z<_ l - (2+pA( l ) - l - (2 -pBq)  -t 
(b) Oz>_ 1 - (2+/3A~) -1 - (2 -pBq)  -1 
(a) Suppose Oy = 0. Then the third line of (8) yields - (Qx, lm) -> (2 +/~A ~)- 1 
- (2 -pBq) -  1. Since Oz = 1 - (Ox, lm), we obtain 
1 + (2 +/~A ~)-  i _ (2 -pBq) -  1 _< Oz_< 1 - (2 +/~A ~)-1 _ (2 -pBq) -  1 
This implies (2 +pA q)-  1 _ 0, which contradicts A > 0. So Oy ~: 0. 
The first line of the inequality (8) yields B~y >_ B~ (2 +/3A ~)-1, or equivalently, 
(Oy, l,,)B~y(Oy, 1,)-i _>B#(2 +pA 0)-1. 
Since Oy(Oy, 1,) -1 cA,,, (1 is undominated and B<0,  we obtain from the last in- 
equality that (Oy, ln)<_(2+pA~) -1. Then the third line of (8) yields (~x, lm) 
_ (2 -pBq) -  1. Since Qz = 1 - (~x, lm) - (Oy, ln), the last two inequalities yield 
0z >_ 1 - (2 +/3A q)-  1 _ (2 -pBq) -  1. Thus 0z = 1 - (2 +pA 0)-  1 _ (2 -pBq) -  1. 
This implies (0x, lm)= (2 -pBq)  -1 and (Oy, 1 , )= (2+/~A~) -1. Then the un- 
dominatedness of p and ~ for (A,B) implies 0C= oC. Consequently Q is un- 
dominated. 
(b) A similar proof shows that also in this case Q is undominated. 
Similarly one shows that also cr is undominated. Hence (Q, cr) is a perfect 
equilibrium for the game (C, ct). 
It is easily verified that then also (o-, Q) = ~,  (/) 9 (p, q) is an undominated and 
hence perfect equilibrium for (C, ct). 
(ii) Let (Q,a) be a perfect equilibrium for (c, ct). We only show that 
(9x(Ox, lm) -1, ay(ay, In)-1) is a perfect equilibrium for (A,B). Suppose ap  cA m 
exists such that pA >-Ox(Ox, lm) -1A. Define ~: = (P(Ox, lm),Qy, Oz) CAm+n+l. 
Then 
OC = (BQy + Qz lm, (Ox, lm)pA - oz ln, (Oy, ln)-(Ox, lm))->~C 9 
Since Q is undominated, this implies O C= pC, and in particular pA = 
Qx(Ox, lm) -1A. Hence Ox(Ox, lm) -1 is undominated. Similarly one shows that 
also ay(ay, ln) -1 is undominated. Hence (9x(Ox, lm) -1, ay(ay, In) -1) is a perfect 
equilibrium for (A,B). 
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A similar proof shows that  (ax(tTx, lm) -1, Qy(Qy, ln) -1) is also a perfect 
equilibrium for (A,B). 9 
Myerson (1978) introduced proper equilibria nd showed that every bimatrix 
game possesses a proper equilibrium. For proper equilibria it is possible to prove 
an analogue to Theorem 6 (ii). 
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